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TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF PUBLIC SPECTACLES:
BOSTON ATHLETIC CHANGES THE RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
In Boston Athletic Association v. Sullivan' ("Boston Athletic"), the
First Circuit Court of Appeals significantly altered traditional trademark
law by granting broad protection to those who conduct well-known
events such as concerts and athletic competitions.2 The First Circuit
held that a person may be enjoined from selling goods referring to the
registered name of a well-known event regardless of whether the public is
likely to be confused into believing that the "infringing" goods are offi-
cially connected to the event.3
II. T-SHIRTS AND TRADEMARKS
A. The Business Of Selling T-Shirts
Selling T-shirts at sporting events is as American as apple pie.
Sports fans proclaim their affiliation with their favorite team by wearing
T-shirts emblazoned with the team's name or emblem.4 Spectators com-
memorate their attendance at championship games5 by purchasing mer-
chandise6 decorated with the name of the competition.7 In fact,
consumers are willing to pay higher prices for products bearing the insig-
nia of professional sports teams than for goods without such decora-
tions.' It should therefore come as no surprise that the sale of
1. 867 F.2d 22 (lst Cir. 1989).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 32-35.
4. See Oddi, Consumer Motivation In Trademark And Unfair Competition Law: On The
Importance Of Source, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1986); Comment, Trademarks: Protection
of Merchandising Properties In Professional Sports, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 927-28 (1983) (authored
by David Kelly); Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights. An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C.L. REV. 603-5 (1984); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868
(1975) (hockey fans buy emblems embroidered with symbols of favorite teams to show public
allegiance or to identify with the teams themselves).
5. Such championship games may include the Super Bowl or the World Series.
6. See National Football League v. Governor of the State of Delaware, 435 F. Supp.
1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977) (Professional sports teams today franchise pennants, T-shirts, hel-
mets, drinking glasses, and a wide range of other products); Kelly, supra note 4 at 928 ("Prod-
ucts displaying NFL team colors and insignia range from adults' and childrens' sweaters, tee
shirts, jerseys, and socks to glassware, key rings, posters, and buttons.").
7. See supra note 4.
8. See Denicola, supra note 4 at 604.
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merchandise emblazoned with the name of athletic teams has become a
multi-million dollar business.9
B. A Short Discussion Of Trademark Law And The Sponsorship Issue
Many people are willing to violate a professional sports team's
trademark'0 by selling products bearing the team's name or logo."I The
Trademark Act of 1946 ("the Lanham Act") governs modern 12 causes of
action for trademark infringement. 3 Under the Lanham Act, a person is
liable for infringement if he, without the consent of the registrant, uses in
commerce any registered mark which is "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive."' 
4
Although there is almost universal agreement that the "likelihood of
confusion" issue has proven to be the key factor in the majority of in-
fringement cases, 5 there is much debate over whether plaintiffs must
prove that consumers are likely to be confused into believing that the
defendant's product or service is officially sponsored by the plaintiff. 16
Traditionally, courts require plaintiffs to prove confusion of source
or sponsorship. 17 As one commentator explains:
The modern rule of law gives the trademark owner protection
against use of its mark on any product or service which would
reasonably be thought by the consuming public to come from
the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected
9. Wong, Recent Trademark Cases Involving Professional and Intercollegiate Sports, DET.
C.L. REV. 87 (1986) (NFL receives millions each year from sale of goods bearing its logo).
10. The Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended by 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987)) defines a trademark as including "any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify and distinguish goods. . . from those manufactured or sold by others."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V. 1946). A service mark, on the other hand, is used to distinguish
one's services from those offered by others. See Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 23 n. 1.
11. See generally Wong, supra note 9 at 88 (growth in use of sports trademarks results in
increased litigation); Kelly, supra note 4 at 929 (large number of counterfeiters attempt to
capitalize on goodwill and market established by professional sports teams); Boston Hockey,
510 F.2d at 1004 (permanent injunction against sale of patches); National Football League
Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (in-
junction against sale of patches). But see Denicola, supra note 8 at 605 (trademark owners
have sometimes lost suits to enjoin sale of infringing goods).
12. Modern trademark law has its origins in the common law tort of unfair competition.
See 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2, at 133-35 (2d ed.
1984).
13. See Lanham Act, supra note 9.
14. See Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1).
15. See Wong, supra note 9 at 89.
16. See infra notes 17-48, and accompanying text.
17. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:3 at 166.
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with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner.'
8
Thus, the Girl Scouts were denied an injunction against the production
of posters depicting a pregnant girl wearing a Girl Scout uniform because
it was unlikely that the public would believe that the Girl Scouts spon-
sored the poster. 9 Similarly, the University of Notre Dame was unable
to stop the release of a book and movie depicting the university and its
president in an unfavorable light, since national readers and movie view-
ers would assume that the depicted events were fictional and not author-
ized by the plaintiff.20
However, some courts have rejected the traditional approach. Sev-
eral courts have indicated that protection will be given in cases where the
purchasing public is likely to identify the infringing product with the
plaintiff's goods. For instance, one court enjoined the defendants from
printing and selling posters with the "Coca-Cola" trademark modified to
read "Enjoy Cocaine" in the familiar Coca-Cola script.2' The court de-
termined that the public could not disassociate the poster from the fa-
mous soft drink.22 Similarly, the Second Circuit, in Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 23 enjoined defendants from
exhibiting a movie which depicted a woman engaging in various sexual
acts while wearing an outfit which resembled the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders' uniform.24 Although it was unlikely that viewers would believe
that the Dallas Cowboys sponsored the movie, the Second Circuit
granted the injunction because "it is hard to believe that anyone who had
seen defendants' sexually depraved film could ever disassociate it from
plaintiff's cheerleaders." 25
The most famous26 decision granting protection even though there
was no confusion regarding sponsorship was issued by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.27 In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas
Cap & Emblem Mfg.28 ("Boston Hockey"), the Fifth Circuit enjoined the
18. Id.
19. Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
20. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d
452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965).
21. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
22. Id. at 1183.
23. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 205.
26. See Denicola, supra note 4, at 606-07 (Boston Hockey most famous, if not the most
infamous).
27. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1004.
28. Id.
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manufacture of emblems embodying several professional hockey teams'
marks, even though there was not a showing of confusion regarding
sponsorship or source.2 9 The National Hockey Association and its mem-
ber teams sought to stop an emblem manufacturer from making and sell-
ing cloth emblems containing the teams' registered trade and service
marks.3° The Fifth Circuit granted the injunction, even though it was
unlikely that purchasers would believe that the patches were manufac-
tured or sponsored by the plaintiff.31 The court determined that the con-
fusion requirement was met since the public would probably identify the
defendant's product with the plaintiff's mark.32 The court stated:
The confusion question here is conceptually difficult .... The
confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the de-
fendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to
the public knowing that the public would identify them as be-
ing the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer
that the source and origin of the trademark symbols were in
plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. The argument
that confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of
the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark,
originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale
of the emblem.33
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning did not go unchallenged. Scholars
characterized the court's analysis as "conclusory" 34 and incoherent.3 5
Other critics emphasized that the decision granted owners of sports em-
blems a virtual monopoly.3 6 One commentator chided, "[tihe Boston
Hockey decision, by equating recognition with confusion, had effectively
precluded the unauthorized merchandising of famous trade symbols
without the inconvenience of explicit analysis."
3 1
Courts also voiced concern. One court described the Boston Hockey
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1009.
31. Id. at 1012.
32. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.
33. Id.
34. See Denicola, supra note 4 at 609.
35. Id. at 607.
36. See generally, Denicola supra note 4 at 613; Laff and Saret, Further Unraveling of
Sears-Comptco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel and Hardy, 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 427 (1976)
(by counsel for Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.); Keating, Patches on the Trademark Law, 67
TRADE-MARK REP. 315 (1977).
37. See Denicola, supra note 4 at 607.
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rationale as "naive."3 Courts rebuffed both musical groups 39 and uni-
versities' ° that claimed that no confusion need be proven regarding
source or sponsorship. Other courts warned that Boston Hockey turned
trademark law into copyright law4" and granted trademark owners a
"complete monopoly over its use ... in commercial merchandising."42
Boston Hockey did not last very long. In Kentucky Fried Chicken
Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,43 the Fifth Circuit retreated from
the broad language in Boston Hockey by construing it to require actual
confusion of sponsorship.' Then, in Supreme Assembly v. J.H Jewelry
Co.,45 the Fifth Circuit explicitly reaffirmed the traditional view that the
Lanham Act requires a showing of confusion regarding source or
sponsorship.46
Supreme Assembly appeared to hammer the final nail in Boston
Hockey's coffin. Even after its demise, scholars and courts criticized
Boston Hockey.47 The Boston Hockey principle, however, was resur-
rected in Boston Athletic Association v. Sullivan.48
III. BOSTON ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION V. SULLIVAN:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Race Begins - The Facts
The Boston Athletic Association ("BAA") and the Boston Mara-
thon share a long history together. BAA has sponsored the Boston Mar-
athon since it was first run in 1897.' 9 In fact, the race used to be called
38. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.
1980).
39. Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no
confusion as to source on buttons displaying name of musical group).
40. University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(no confusion of sponsorship in sale of clothing bearing name of university).
41. General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regency Co., 421 F. Supp. at 362 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
42. Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 918.
43. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
44. Id. at 390.
45. 676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. Id. at 1082. See also Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conan's Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 156
(5th Cit. 1985) (plaintiff must prove likelihood of source, affiliation, or source in mind of the
ordinary consumer).
47. See supra notes 34-42. But see University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, 686
F.2d 1040, 1045-47 (3d Cir. 1982) (approving of Boston Hockey); Processed Plastic, 675 F.2d
at 855; University of Georgia v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 (11 th Cir. 1985).
48. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d 22.
49. Id. at 24.
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the "Boston Athletic Association Marathon."5° A few days before the
annual race, BAA would sponsor an exposition where various businesses
sold merchandise5 in anticipation of the race.52
In 1983, BAA began a campaign to market its name via licensing
agreements.5 3  BAA registered the names "Boston Marathon" and
"BAA Marathon" in Massachusetts in 1983."4 Then, in 1985, BAA reg-
istered the name "Boston Marathon" with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office."
Defendants Beau Tease Inc. and Mark Sullivan 6 were also inter-
ested in merchandising products referring to the Boston Marathon. Sul-
livan retails wearing apparel in Hopkinton, Massachusetts.57 Beau Tease
is a Massachusetts corporation which imprints and distributes shirts in
the trade.5 8 In 1978, Beau Tease began to imprint and Sullivan began to
sell shirts bearing the "Boston Marathon" name.59
At first, BAA and Beau Tease had a friendly relationship. In 1984,
BAA entered into an agreement with Beau Tease whereby Beau Tease
sold to BAA a large quantity of shirts which BAA gave away to athletes
and volunteers during the 1985 race.'
However, the cordial relationship between Beau Tease and BAA
ended in 1986.61 In that year, BAA entered into an exclusive licensing
agreement with Image Impact ("Image") for BAA's service mark62 on
wearing apparel. 63 After executing their agreement, BAA and Image no-
tified the relevant market that Image was BAA's exclusive licensee.
64
They also warned that any unauthorized use of the name "Boston Mara-
thon" or any similar name would violate the exclusive rights of BAA and
Image.65
50. Id. at 28. The race was also called "Boston A.A. Marathon." The race has been
called "Boston Marathon" since 1917. Id.
51. Id. at 24. Businesses would sell merchandise such as T-shirts and running apparel.
52. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 24. At the BAA booth, the registered runners would pick
up their numbers and other official information. Id.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 24-25.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 35. Sullivan was doing business as "Good Life." Id.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 25.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 10.
63. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 25.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 25.
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But Beau Tease and Sullivan failed to heed the warning. In March
of 1986, defendants began to merchandise 66 shirts referring to the 1986
Marathon.
67
BAA attempted to prevent Beau Tease and Sullivan from selling the
shirts by filing for a preliminary injunction in Massachusetts Superior
Court.68 The superior court denied BAA's request. 69 BAA appealed,
but the denial was affirmed by a single justice on the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals, and the action was dismissed without prejudice.70
Fresh from their victory, Beau Tease and Sullivan prepared to sell
more shirts. In late 1986 and early 1987, Beau Tease began to manufac-
ture and Sullivan began to retail shirts and other apparel referring to the
1987 Boston Marathon.71
On April 1, 1987, BAA and Image sued Beau Tease and Sullivan in
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.72
BAA and Image claimed that the defendants' 1986 and 1987 shirts in-
fringed on BAA's marks.73 In their complaint, BAA and Image alleged
confusion in violation of the Lanham Act.74 BAA and Image also filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from manu-
facturing or selling any article bearing the name "Boston Marathon" or
any similar name.75
On April 8, 1987, the district court conducted a hearing at which it
combined the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits. 76
The President of Image, Mickey Lawrence, testified that purchasers told
him that they confused the plaintiffs' shirts with the defendants' shirts.77
In a bench opinion, the court did not enjoin Sullivan, but did prelimina-
66. Beau Tease imprinted shirts and other apparel referring to the Boston Marathon and
Sullivan sold the apparel to the public. Id.
67. Id. at 25. The defendant's 1986 shirts included a logo which contained the year, a
picture of runners, and the words "Hopkinton-Boston."
68. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 25.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The 1987 shirts had an imprint which contained the words "1987 Marathon," a
picture of runners, and the phrase "Hopkinton-Boston." Beau Tease and Sullivan planned to
sell the shirts and other items at the exposition. Id.
72. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 25.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 25. The complaint also included state law counts for dilution, sale of counter-
feits and imitations, and unauthorized use of a name. Id.
75. Id.
76. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 25.
77. Id.
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rily enjoin Beau Tease from selling shirts directly at the exposition.7"
On April 17, 1987, BAA appealed and moved for an injunction.
The court of appeals, however, denied the injunction and the appeal was
dismissed without prejudice.79
The case returned to the district court where the plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment, a declaratory judgment with respect to their rights
in the name "Boston Marathon," and an injunction against the defend-
ants' design.8 0
B. The District Court's Holding - Defendants Take The Lead
On March 7, 1988, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
an injunction and granted summary judgment for Beau Tease and Sulli-
van.81 The court reasoned that although BAA's marks were valid, there
was no confusion as a matter of law between plaintiffs' and defendants'
shirts.8 2 The court determined that since the public was unaware that
BAA sponsored the race, the public could not infer that the official spon-
sor of the race endorsed defendants' shirts.3 In addition, the court
found that the evidence presented by Lawrence was not only self-serving,
but was inadmissible hearsay. 4 There was no testimony from "disinter-
ested persons" that people were confused regarding the source of defend-
ants' shirts.8 5 The preliminary injunction was dissolved. BAA and
Image appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals."
C. First Circuit's Holding - Plaintiffs Take The Gold
1. BAA's Right to Run: Plaintiffs Clear the Genericness
and Prior Usage Hurdles
The First Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis 7 by con-
78. Id. at 26. The court also enjoined Beau Tease from marketing shirts to anyone who it
knew would sell the 1987 shirts at the exposition. Id.
79. Id.
80. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 26. The plaintiff also moved for a preliminary injunction,
an injunction against defendants' 1988 shirts and design, and an injunction against the defend-
ants' design with any year on it. Id.
81. Id. at 26-27.
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id at 26.
84. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 26-27.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Id.
87. The court noted that the case was really a service mark infringement case, not a trade-
mark infringement case. Id. at 23. However, the court observed that for purposes of the
matter at hand the distinction between the two types of marks was irrelevant. Consequently,
cases discussing either types of marks could be applied to the instant case. Id at n. 1.
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fronting two of the defendants' arguments. Beau Tease and Sullivan con-
tended that BAA's marks were unworthy of protection because (1) the
term "Boston Marathon" is "generic"" and because (2) defendants' use
of the term "Boston Marathon" since at least 1978 constitutes a "prior
usage. "89
Regarding the "genericness" argument, the court stated that the de-
fendants had failed to present any relevant evidence showing that the
term "Boston Marathon" had become a generic term.9 0 The court noted
that the defendants relied on Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group 91 ('Anti-Monopoly") to support their contention that "Boston
Marathon" had become a common descriptive term.9 2 The Boston Ath-
letic court stated that Anti-Monopoly stood for the proposition that a
term may be deemed generic if it is used to denote a unique product or
service. 93 The Boston Athletic court then determined that Congress nulli-
fied the Anti-Monopoly holding in 1984 by a congressional amendment
which stated that a term was not to be deemed generic merely because
the mark is used as a name of or to identify a unique product or service.94
According to the congressional amendment, the primary significance of
the registered mark to the relevant public (rather than purchaser motiva-
tion) was to be the test for determining whether the registered mark has
become generic.9" Finally, the First Circuit concluded that since the de-
fendants introduced no evidence on the "primary significance" issue,
they failed to prove that "Boston Marathon" is a common descriptive
term.96
88. If a term is deemed generic, it is unworthy of protection. A term is generic when it
becomes a common descriptive name of goods or services. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12,
§ 12.1 at 520-21.
89. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 27.
90. Id.
91. 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.,
515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (granting permanent injunction to plaintiff on remand),
aff'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
92. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 27.
93. Id. The First Circuit stated:
In its first opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded its summary of the law of generic-
ness by stating that "when members of the consuming public use a game name to
denote the game itself, and not its producer, the trademark is generic and, therefore,
invalid (citation omitted). In its second opinion, the court relied heavily on a survey,
which measured the motive of purchasers in selecting a "Monopoly" game, in decid-
ing that "Monopoly" was a generic term."
-Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 27. The First Circuit reasoned:
The burden of proof is on the party seeking to have a registered mark declared a
generic to show that it has become so .... Here, the defendants have introduced no
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The First Circuit quickly disposed of the defendants' argument that
their use of the term "Boston Marathon" on shirts from 1978 constituted
a "prior usage."' 97 The court reasoned that the "uncontradicted evi-
dence," showing that BAA had been using the term "Boston Marathon"
since 1917, defeated defendants' "prior use" contention. 98 Moreover, the
court noted that a mark protects not only a product or service, but also
related items or services. 99 The court explained that the apparel sold by
BAA is related to the service which BAA provides,"°° and BAA is there-
fore entitled to enjoin the use of its marks on such items. °o
2. The Longest Stretch: Likelihood of Confusion Issue
a. Two Track Analysis
On the issue of whether there was likelihood of confusion, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating that the confusion
issue involves two "distinct but inseparable questions."'° 2 The first ques-
tion is whether the public is likely to confuse the defendants' T-shirts
with the plaintiffs' T-shirts."°3 The second question, often called the
"promotional goods issue," is whether the purchasing public is likely to
believe that the sponsor of the Boston Marathon endorses defendants'
shirts.'04
b. Confusion of Goods Track
The First Circuit commenced its discussion of the "confusion of
goods" question by listing eight factors courts in that circuit have used to
determine whether there is "likelihood of confusion" between goods.105
These factors include: the similarity of the marks; similarity of the
goods; the relationship between the parties' channels of trade; the rela-
tionship between the parties' advertising; the classes of prospective pur-
chasers; evidence of actual confusion; the defendant's intent in adopting
evidence on the issue of "primary significance" and thus, have failed to meet the
burden of proof.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 27-28.
99. Id. at 27.
100. The services provided by BAA included the operation and sponsorship of the Boston
Marathon. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 23, 28.
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 28-29.
104. Id. at 27-28.
105. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 29.
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its mark; and the strength of plaintiff's mark. 1' 6 The court noted that
"[n]o one factor is necessarily determinative, but each must be
considered." 07
The court'0 8 observed that all eight factors weighed heavily in favor
of the plaintiffs."° First, the court observed that the defendants' logos
referred specifically to the Boston Marathon race.' 0 In addition, the
court noted that the parties manufactured virtually the same goods-T-
shirts."' The court then stated that the parties sold the products at the
same time during the race and in the same area." 2 Furthermore, the
court emphasized that the parties used the same method of advertis-
ing," 3 and distributed the goods to the same class of people.' ' The
court also noted that the parties sold the shirts under hectic conditions
for about the same amount of money. ' s Moreover, the court stated that
the plaintiffs offered substantial evidence that some people were actually
confused about who sponsored defendants' shirts." 6 The court also de-
termined that defendants intended to trade on BAA's sponsorship and
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Chief Judge Campbell disagreed with the majority's view that plaintiffs were entitled to
summary judgment on the confusion of goods question. In Judge Campbell's opinion, there
remained a question of material fact whether prospective purchasers would be likely to confuse
defendants' T-shirts with plaintiffs'. However, Judge Campbell joined with the court's opinion
regarding the "promotional goods" issue. Id. at 29 n.5.
109. Id. at 29-32.
110. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 29-30. The court bolstered its argument by noting that
there is only one Boston Marathon race. In addition, the court observed that the defendants'
logos refer to the term "Boston Marathon" and depicts runners. The race is run annually, and
the defendants refer to a specific year implying an annual event. In addition, the court noted
that the race begins in Hopkinton and ends in Boston, and the defendants shirts refer to these
cities. "Despite this, defendants have introduced no evidence showing that they have taken
steps to turn their similarly marked products into dissimilar ones by clearly distinguishing
their products, and their lack of BAA sponsorship, from those sold by plaintiffs." Id. at 29.
111. Id. at 30.
112. The court noted that the parties sell their shirts mostly in Boston area retail shops, at
the exposition and along the race course. The parties center their activities on the day of the
race. Id.
113. Id. at 30. The court observed that the plaintiffs and defendants advertised the shirts in
store display windows, in booths at the exposition, and along the race course. Id.
114. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 30. The court noted that prospective purchasers were
drawn from the public at large. Id
115. Id. at 30. The shirts retail for about $7.00-10.00. Id.
116. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 31. The court emphasized that Lawrence, the President of
Image Impact, reported that a shopper at a department store was surprised when Lawrence
told her that defendants' shirt, which the shopper was wearing, was not an "official" Boston
Marathon Shirt. The court argued that although the evidence presented by Lawrence may not
be as accurate as survey data, the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that some people were
actually confused about who sponsored defendants' shirts. Id.
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management of the Boston Marathon." 7 Finally, the court observed
that BAA's mark was strong."
8
The court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary
judgment on the confusion of goods issue." 9 In so holding, the court
reasoned that there was undisputed evidence showing that the purchas-
ing public was likely to mistake defendants' T-shirts with the plaintiffs'
T-shirts. 2 ' The court also noted that since BAA's mark was very
strong, it was worthy of broad protection. 2'
c. Promotional Goods Issue Track
i. Rules of the Race: Or What the Plaintiffs Must Prove
The First Circuit began its discussion of the sponsorship issue"' by
stating that although the plaintiffs must establish that the defendants are
trading on plaintiffs' mark or goodwill, the plaintiffs do not "also have to
prove that members of the public will actually conclude that defendants'
product was officially endorsed by the Marathon's sponsor (whoever
that sponsor may be)."' 23 The court suggested two reasons why it did
not require plaintiffs to prove likelihood of confusion regarding
sponsorship. 124
First, the court stated that it is virtually impossible to determine
whether the public believes that a person's use of a logo is officially en-
dorsed by the logo's owner. 25 The court reasoned:
[Flew people, other than legal specialists, could venture an in-
formed opinion on whether someone using the logo of a spon-
sor of a sporting event is required to have the permission of the
event's sponsor. Lacking such knowledge, the question of ap-
proval is pure guesswork. To ask a factfinder to determine
whether the public would think that defendants' shirts were
"authorized" or "official" shirts is to ask it to resolve a confus-
117. Id. at 32. The court emphasized that the defendants placed their logos referring to the
Boston Marathon on the same type of product which the plaintiffs marketed, and sold those
products in the same location and at the same time that the plaintiffs sold their goods. Id.
118. Id. The court reasoned that BAA had used its mark for a long period of time before
registering it and that the media constantly exposed the public to the fact that BAA sponsored
the prestigious race. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 32.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The Boston Athletic court referred to the sponsorship issue as the "promotional goods
issue." Id. In this note, the two terms are used interchangeably.
123. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
124. Id. at 33-35.
125. Id. at 33.
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ing and, in many contexts, virtually meaningless question.'26
The court buttressed this proposition by noting that the "pertinent case
law recognizes the difficulty of asking factfinders to decide whether uses
are 'authorized'."' 27
Second, the court noted that determining whether the public be-
lieves that a product is officially sponsored raises "a problem of circular-
ity."' 28 The court quoted Professor McCarthy:
If consumers think that most uses of a trademark require au-
thorization, then in fact they will require authorization because
the owner can enjoin consumer confusion by unpermitted uses
or charge for licenses. And if owners can sue to stop unauthor-
ized uses, then only authorized uses will be seen by consumers,
creating or reinforcing the perception that authorization is nec-
essary. This is a "chicken and the egg" conundrum.
129
The court also observed that where the defendant intentionally cop-
ies another's design, courts should presume that there is confusion. 130 In
cases of intentional copying, the second comer is generally "presumed to
have intended confusing similarity of appearance and to have succeeded
in doing so."' 3 '
ii. Plaintiffs Cross the Finish Line
The court concluded that the plaintiffs met their burden regarding
the promotional goods issue.132 "Defendants' shirts are clearly designed
to take advantage of the Boston Marathon and to benefit from the good
will associated with its promotion by the plaintiffs."' 133 The court stated
that the defendants, like Rosie Ruiz, 13 obtained a "free ride" at BAA's
expense.131 In addition, the court observed that there was "undisputed"
evidence showing that consumers were likely to purchase the shirts be-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
129. Id. (quoting 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:3, at 170
(2d ed. 1984)).
130. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34.
131. Id. at 34, (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1018, 1021
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983)).
132. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34.
133. Id. at 33.
134. Rosie Ruiz was the first woman to cross the finish line at the 1980 Boston Marathon.
However, she was stripped of her gold medal after it was discovered that she may have
cheated. See Leavy, Ruiz Stripped of Title in Boston; Ruiz Loses Race Title in Boston, Wash.
Post, Apr. 29, 1980, at D1.
135. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
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cause of that reference.' 36 The court reasoned that it is therefore fair to
presume that purchasers would likely believe that defendants' shirts had
some connection with the official sponsor of the Boston Marathon.,
37
Finally, the court concluded that given the presumption in favor of plain-
tiffs and the fact that defendants offered no evidence that would rebut
that presumption, there is no genuine issue of material fact about the
promotional goods issue.
1 38
IV. IMPACT OF BOSTON ATHLETIC
Read broadly, Boston Athletic represents a significant change in
traditional trademark law. At the very least, the court recognized a "re-
buttable presumption" of confusion when the defendant intentionally re-
fers to the plaintiff's mark, and the public is likely to buy defendant's
product because of that reference. 139 Moreover, the Boston Athletic court
implied that sponsors of famous events can obtain an injunction against
any seller who "benefit(s) from the good will" associated with the event's
promotion." The court not only enjoined the defendants from selling
products bearing the words "Boston Marathon," it also prohibited the
merchandising of products with no direct reference to the race. ' Taken
literally, the Boston Athletic decision seems to have created a new prop-
erty right in the promotion of well-known events.
The holding, however, is ambiguous. Boston Athletic can be inter-
preted to mean that an event will only receive protection if the event is
very well-known. In addition, the decision can also be construed to grant
protection only in cases of intentional copying.'42 The court also left
open the possibility that sale of merchandise referring to an event would
not be subject to an injunction if the seller of the "infringing" goods
takes steps to clearly distinguish his products from the plaintiff's
merchandise. 1
4 3
Whatever interpretation is adopted, it is clear that Boston Athletic
sends a strong message to merchants that the First Circuit will have no
sympathy for those who use another's mark without permission. The
First Circuit opinion has a decidedly moral tone. The court compared
136. Id. at 34.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 35.
139. Id. at 34.
140. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
141. Id. at 35. For instance the court enjoined the defendants from selling shirts merely
embodying the words "Boston," a picture of runners, and the date. Id.
142. Id. at 34-35.
143. Id. at 29.
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the defendants to Rosie Ruiz'" and stated that the defendants were un-
justly enriched by their use of BAA's mark. 145 Moreover, it is highly
unusual for a court's determination regarding the confusion issue to be
reversed. '46
V. A CRITICAL LOOK AT BOSTON ATHLETIC
The First Circuit's opinion has four major flaws.'47 First, the
court's decision is inconsistent. On the one hand, the court stated that
determining whether there is confusion regarding sponsorship is im-
possible.' 4 On the other hand, the court recognized a "rebuttable pre-
sumption" of confusion regarding sponsorship in cases of intentional
copying. 49 How can there be a rebuttable presumption about a fact that
cannot be proven? The First Circuit seems to believe that while it is
unreasonable to make the plaintiff prove confusion of source, it is none-
theless fair to require the defendant to disprove confusion. 150
Second, it is possible for the factfinder to determine whether the
public is likely to be confused regarding the source of a particular prod-
uct. Plaintiffs can prove confusion by conducting a survey. 151 In fact,
courts have been critical of well-financed plaintiffs who have failed to
conduct a survey on the confusion issue.' 52
Third, the Boston Athletic court's use of precedent is flawed. 53 The
First Circuit cited Boston Hockey to substantiate its conclusion that
plaintiffs should not have to prove confusion regarding sponsorship. 1
54
But, as the First Circuit concedes, 155 Boston Hockey has been over-
turned.' 56 The court's reliance on Boston Hockey is odd particularly
since Boston Hockey has been criticized by scholars and courts alike for
144. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
145. Id.
146. See Fletcher & Wald, The Fortieth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 77 TRADE-MARK REP. at 610 (1987) ("determinations of no likelihood of confu-
sion after trial are reasonably conclusive").
147. This note will only analyze the court's treatment of the "sponsorship" issue.
148. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
149. Id. at 33-35.
150. Id. at 34-35.
151. National Football League v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, 532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D.
Wash. 1982) (survey indicating consumers believed jerseys were authorized by NFL).
Processed Plastics Co. v. Warner Communications, 675 F.2d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1982) (survey
indicating children believed toy car sponsored by television show).
152. Evans & Gunn, Trademark Surveys, 79 TRADE-MARK REP. at 1, 26 (1989).
153. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33-34.
154. Id. at 33.
155. Id. at 33 n.10.
156. See supra notes 40-44, and accompanying text.
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its incoherent reasoning and superficial analysis. 57
Fourth, Boston Athletic simply goes too far in protecting trademark
holders who conduct events. Though the court quoted the well-known
principle that a trademark is not "a right in gross,"15 it virtually pre-
vented any person from selling products at the site of the Boston Mara-
thon. Beau Tease and Sullivan could not sell their shirts to anyone, even
though a majority of people did not care who sponsored the Boston Mar-
athon. 159 The court's decision is therefore inconsistent with the intent of
the Lanham Act. As Judge Fletcher noted in International Order of
Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,: 6
[T]he Lanham Act and its legislative history reveals no
congressional design to bestow ...broad property rights on
trademark owners. Its scope is much narrower: to protect con-
sumers against deceptive designations of the origin of goods
and, conversely, to enable producers to differentiate their prod-
ucts from those of others.1
6 '
The monopoly granted to BAA is especially inequitable since people
at the race do not care that BAA sponsored the race. Though people
commonly identify themselves by wearing items embodying the insignia
of their favorite sports team, "it would be naive to conclude that the
name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product
somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name
or emblem signifies."'
162
Moreover, as the First Circuit conceded, until 1983 BAA had done
little to promote its alleged mark. 63 In fact, the Marathon has histori-
cally failed to gain corporate sponsorship because it is held on a Monday,
which is not attractive to spectators and the media. 16' Therefore, the
First Circuit's conclusion (that defendants were trying to get a "free
157. See supra notes 25-31, and accompanying text.
158. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 35 (quoting University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C.
Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
159. As Professor Denicola notes, such a prohibition:
reserve[s] to the plaintiff an exclusive right to the merchandising of its symbols de-
spite the absence of any judicial or legislative analysis of the social or moral utility of
the resulting monopoly .... Confusion may give good cause for relief, but a remedy
that excludes others from the market on that rationale alone can only ensure inequity
and forestall a direct assessment of the wisdom of a merchandising monopoly.
See Denicola, supra note 4 at 613.
160. 633 F.2d at 912.
161. Id. at 918.
162. Id.
163. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 24-25.
164. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1980, § 6 (Magazine) at 124, col. 4.
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ride"' 65 from the plaintiffs' "expenditure of labor, skill, and money")' 66
appears to be nothing more than a hyperbole.
The First Circuit's decision leaves entrepreneurs in a state of limbo.
It is unclear whether the injunction applies to all merchants who sell
products referring to the Marathon or only to those who sell merchan-
dise on the day of the race and in the Boston area. Under the guise of
protecting a "charitable organization"' 67 like the BAA, the First Circuit
issued a decision which will financially crush small merchants who
deceive no one while honestly peddling their wares.'
68
VI. CONCLUSION
In Boston Athletic, the First Circuit significantly altered traditional
trademark law by granting broad protection to those who conduct well-
known events. The decision bestows to one class of people a virtual mo-
nopoly to sell goods referring to a public spectacle. Though sports fran-
chisers and promoters may applaud the First Circuit decision, consumers
and merchants should be gravely concerned.
Alan I Cyrlin*
165. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33.
166. Id. (quoting International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).
167. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 24.
168. The Boston Athletic court referred to the BAA as a "charitable organization." Id. In
fact, the BAA is run more like a business. BAA's administrator, Guy Morse, admits that the
BAA is "like any other small industry." The race elicits approximately $12 million a year
from corporate sponsors. See Reinert, Boston Marathon Crosses the Finish Line in Black Ink,
B. Bus. J. Aug. 21, 1989 at 8.
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